In this paper we provide a result that shows existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in cases in which existent methods are problematic to apply. We employ this result to the model with simple logit demand, and show existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium when …rms produce multiple non-symmetric products. Our proof for this case is based only on the intuitive assumption that market shares are decreasing in own price.
Introduction
Price equilibrium models with di¤erentiated products have received much attention recently especially in the empirical industrial organization literature. Important examples of this literature are the works by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) , Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) and Nevo (2001) . The models in these studies use pricing assumptions in order to estimate the model parameters. Existence of price equilibrium is a necessary condition for the identi…cation of the parameters. Uniqueness of price equilibrium is important from a practical point of view since it is a requirement for applying the structural empirical approach for policy analysis via simulation estimators. Uniqueness of equilibrium is also useful for e¢ cient estimation because it is a necessary condition for constructing the e¢ cient instruments (Sándor, 2001, Berry, Linton and Pakes, 2003) .
Existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium is also important from a theoretical point of view. Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) establish price equilibrium existence results for rather general model speci…cations and uniqueness results for some particular cases. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) provide a review of equilibrium results for models with logit demand. Peitz (2000) extends the results of Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) to cases that can be viewed as more realistic, like utility maximization with a budget constraint or boundedly rational consumers. Mizuno (2003) extends the uniqueness results of Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) . All these studies assume that …rms produce one product and their approaches cannot be easily generalized to multi-product …rms. consider multi-product …rms and show the existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium in a model with nested logit demand and symmetric products. This latter feature makes this result so speci…c that it cannot be generalized to a model with realistic non-symmetric products. Another way to deal with multi-product …rms is shown by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , who study supermodular and log-supermodular games. However, the pricing games involved in empirically relevant models do not necessarily satisfy these properties.
In this paper we provide a result that can serve as a tool for showing existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium in some cases in which the approaches mentioned above cannot. This is the topic of the next section. We apply this result to a simple version of the models from Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001) , the model with simple logit demand, and show existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium when …rms produce multiple products without the symmetry property. The simple logit demand model, although empirically less relevant since it generates restrictive substitution patterns, is often used to illustrate various estimation features (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) and in Monte Carlo simulations (e.g., Berry, Linton and Pakes, 2003) . In spite of the fact that it is known as a well-behaved model, no proof of existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium has been established in the literature. For example, Berry, Linton and Pakes (2003, p.15 ) mention that price equilibrium for the simple logit is known to be unique only when each product is owned by a di¤erent …rm. We present the proof of existence and uniqueness in section 3, and we make some …nal remarks in section 4.
An equilibrium result
In this section we brie ‡y discuss the available theoretical results regarding existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium, and then present our result. The classical approach for showing existence is based on the result according to which games with convex and compact strategy sets and quasi-concave pay-o¤ functions have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium is obtained as the …xed point of the best reply by applying the Brouwer or Kakutani …xed point theorem. This approach is taken by Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) , who use results on generalized concavity of probabilities to prove that the pro…t functions are quasi-concave. For multi-product …rms quasi-concavity of the pro…t functions is di¢ cult to verify with this method, while a direct proof is typically hard to obtain.
An essentially di¤erent approach is supermodularity. Supermodularity of games was applied by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to a number of equilibrium problems.
These authors establish among others that with one-product …rms the pricing game corresponding to the model with simple logit demand is log-supermodular and therefore has a unique price equilibrium. Supermodularity or log-supermodularity, as they show, guarantees the existence of equilibrium also in games where the strategy sets are multi-dimensional, but it appears that in general the pricing games arising from the empirical models of interest do not satisfy these properties. An example underpinning this statement is the model with simple logit demand, as we show in Appendix B.
Uniqueness of the price equilibrium is typically established by proving that the second derivative of the pro…t function has the dominant diagonal property. This condition, however, appears to be too strong for the models that we consider, and therefore we use a more general approach. For a detailed exposition of methods for proving Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness we refer to Vives (1999) .
Our approach is di¤erent from those discussed above in that we consider the price equilibrium as the solution of the …rst order conditions of pro…t maximization and not as the …xed point of the best reply function (or correspondence). Hence we establish that the …rst order conditions have a solution and show that any such solution is a Nash equilibrium of the game. For this we show that a player's strategy corresponding to a solution is the best reply to the other players'strategies corresponding to this solution. Uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of the solution to the …rst order conditions.
We turn now to the formal exposition. Assume a game with a …nite number of players denoted f = 1; :::; F whose strategies are multi-dimensional real convex The result on which our equilibrium existence and uniqueness is based is the following.
Proposition 1 Consider a game for which there is a strategy p that satis…es the conditions:
1. For any f 2 f1; :::;
2. For any f 2 f1; :::; F g there is exactly one p f for which
3. For any f 2 f1; :::; F g, f p f ; p f has an interior global maximum with
Then p is a Nash equilibrium of the game. If, in addition, there is a unique p satisfying condition 1, then it is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. In order for p to be a Nash equilibrium it should satisfy that f p f ; p f f p f ; p f for any p f 2 D f : By condition 3 there is a p f 2 D f that is an interior global maximum point of f ; p f . This satis…es
it is a Nash equilibrium. Since any Nash equilibrium of the game necessarily satis…es condition 1, the uniqueness follows.
We note that conditions 2 and 3 of the proposition can be viewed as a generalization of strict quasi-concavity of the pro…t function and they imply that there is a unique best reply to the equilibrium strategies.
We introduce a function g whose …xed points are exactly the solutions of the …rst order conditions of pro…t maximization, that is, g (p) = p if and only if
for any f 2 f1; :::; F g. In order to demonstrate that conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma 1 are satis…ed we use a …xed point uniqueness result, which is an implication of Kellogg's (1976) result.
Lemma 2 (Kellogg, 1976) Let g : D ! D be a continuously di¤erentiable function on a convex compact set D R n . If det @g (p) @p 0 I n 6 = 0 for any p 2 D; and g has no …xed points on the boundary of D then g has a unique …xed point.
This result is used twice in the proof: once for existence and once for uniqueness.
Existence is based on the uniqueness of the pro…t maximizing solution. In order to
show that condition 3 holds we use the next result, proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 3 Assume that the pro…t function f of …rm f is de…ned on the interval 
Then for any p f = 2 c f ; p f and for any p f 2 [c f ;
An implication of this lemma is that a pro…t function which satis…es these conditions has interior global maximum. The lemma, in words, states that if such a pro…t function is decreasing in the prices of the …rm beyond a certain bound and increasing at the marginal cost values, then the global maximum of the pro…t function is attained at points that are kept between some bounds. These bounds prevent the pro…t function from having a global maximum on the boundary of its de…nition domain.
3 The simple logit case
Suppose that there are J products in the market denoted 1; :::; J. For j 2 f1; :::; Jg, let d j and p j denote the characteristics and the price of product j; respectively. The utility of an individual i who purchases product j is
where is a scalar parameter, " ij is an iid type I extreme value random variable, and product 0 represents the alternative when no product is purchased. In empirical studies d j is typically taken as a linear function of several characteristics of product j. The probability that product j is purchased, which we regard as the market share of product j, is
Due to the simplicity of this formula the simple logit model is often used for illustrating various issues regarding discrete choice. From an empirical point of view it is well known that its applicability is limited due to the restrictive substitution patterns that it generates.
Suppose further that the J products are produced by F …rms and each …rm f 2 f1; :::; F g sells a subset G f of the J products. The pro…t of …rm f is
where c j denotes the constant marginal cost of producing product j. 
where p f , c f and s f are the price, marginal cost and market share vectors corresponding to the products of …rm f , and f is the vector of ones with jG f j number of elements. This system of equations implies that the function g whose …xed points are the solutions of the …rst order conditions of pro…t maximization should be de…ned as
for f = 1; :::; F; and (4) g (p) = g 1 (p) 0 ; :::; g F (p) 0 0 :
Below we show that this pricing game has a unique Nash equilibrium. The only necessary assumption is the intuitive > 0. The proof of the …nal result relies on Proposition 1.
First we show the existence of a J-dimensional compact interval that g transforms into itself. Then we verify that g satis…es the conditions of Lemma 2. This way we show that conditions 1 and 2 of Proposition 1 hold. Finally we show that the conditions of Lemma 3 are satis…ed, which on its turn implies condition 3 of Proposition 1.
We start by demonstrating the conditions of Lemma 2. The function g from (4) has the components
for any f and j 2 G f :
We de…ne B j c j + 1 1 s 0 (c) for any j 2 f1; :::; Jg ;
where s 0 (c) is the probability of the no-purchase alternative computed for p = c.
The following result (proved in Appendix A) shows that there is a compact interval which is transformed by g into itself, and there is no …xed point of g on the boundary of this interval.
Proposition 4 For any p 2 [c 1 ; 1) :::
Next we establish the nonsingularity of the Jacobian of g minus the identity matrix. This then completes the proof of the conditions of Lemma 2.
Proposition 5 The function g is continuously di¤erentiable on R J and for any
Finally, we prove that the conditions of Lemma 3 are satis…ed.
Proposition 6 For any …rm f and any j 2 G f there exists a p j > c j such that
for any p j p j and p j c j .
Proof. The derivative of f with respect to p j can be written as
First we note that the pro…t f (p) is bounded in p. This can be seen from
for p j c j and the fact that exp
Then it follows that for large p j the right hand side of the inequality below is negative:
This implies the existence of p j with the announced property.
The second inequality from the statement of the proposition follows directly from (5).
The …nal result regarding the existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium is contained in the following statement. Proof. The proof is based on Proposition 1. For each j 2 f1; :::; Jg we de…ne
Let the pro…t function of …rm f be de…ned on [c f ; K f ]. Then Lemma 3 implies that 
Final remarks
We have presented a result that shows existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in some situations in which previously used results cannot. We applied this result to the model with simple logit demand. Adopting realistic assumptions like multiproduct …rms and non-symmetric products, we have shown that the pricing game in this model has a unique Nash equilibrium. The only condition used in the proof is that market shares of products are decreasing in own price.
In the proofs of both existence and uniqueness of price equilibrium we employed Kellogg's (1976) …xed point theorem. There is a connection between this approach and the so-called global univalence approach of Gale and Nikaido (1965) . It turns out that application of the former comes down to verifying conditions similar to the case when we apply the latter. We refer to Vives (1999, p.47-48) for more details on the latter approach.
The simple logit model is among the simplest models of discrete choice demand.
Yet we could not apply the methods established in the literature for proving the existence of price equilibrium in the multi-product case. This is because, on the one hand, the pricing game implied is not (log-)supermodular, and on the other hand, due to multi-dimensionality of the pro…t functions, their quasi-concavity appears di¢ cult to judge. This remains to be an interesting puzzle.
Continuing the remarks on the complexity of our proof, we mention that a powerful tool used extensively to prove uniqueness in general equilibrium problems, is the so-called index theory (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, 1985 for a fairly detailed presentation). This theory can also be applied in the framework of the present paper, and it o¤ers a more general approach. But in spite of the generalization o¤ered, this approach does not signi…cantly simplify the proof. Neither does the additional observation that the Hessians of the pro…t functions evaluated at the solutions to the …rst order conditions are negative de…nite (because they are diagonal matrices with negative diagonal elements; see equation (11) in Appendix B). From index theory it follows that the …rst order conditions have a unique interior solution, but it is not possible to avoid the proof that the pro…ts have interior global maximum points.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 3. Take an arbitrary p f = 2 c f ; p f . For any j 2 G f de…ne e p f by its components
where " j > 0 will be speci…ed below. Denote the products of …rm f by f 1; f 2; :::; f L.
For showing the other steps of inequality (7) we proceed similarly. The strict inequality from (2) is implied by the fact that if p f = 2 c f ; p f then at least one component of p f ; say j; satis…es that p j = 2 c j ; p j .
Lemma 8 Let M be an F F non-singular matrix, a scalar and u and v column vectors of size F . Then
and hence the matrix M uv 0 is non-singular if and only if 1 v 0 M 1 u 6 = 0. If this last non-equality holds, then
(For a proof we refer to Dhrymes, 1984, p.40.) Proof of Proposition 4. The …rst part of the inequality is obvious. For the second part, because the probabilities of all alternatives sum to one, and s 0 is increasing in p, we have
From (8) standard logit model. From Proposition 7 it follows that there is a unique price equilibrium, p , and this solves the …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization, that is, @ f (p ) @p j = 0 for any f and j 2 G f . Equation (5) implies that
The second order derivative of the pro…t function for j; h 2 G f ; j 6 = h is
Computed at the equilibrium price, this is zero:
due to (10) and @ f (p ) @p h = 0. We use this fact to show the following.
Proposition 9 For arbitrary j; h 2 G f there exists a p arbitrarily close to p such that 1. @ 2 f p @p j @p h < 0 and 2. @ 2 ln f p @p j @p h < 0.
Proof. Take any " > 0 and de…ne p such that p j = p j + "; p h = p h + " and p r = p r for all r 6 = j; h:
Due to Theorem 7 p f is a unique global maximum of f ; p f . Thus for any " > 0 we have f p < f (p ). We observe another way of writing the second order derivatives:
Then (11) implies that 2 p j c j (p h c h ) + 2 f (p ) = 0:
From the de…nition of p we have
